On the AAGL Protocol by Chowdhury, M. M.
ar
X
iv
:0
70
8.
23
97
v5
  [
cs
.C
R]
  2
2 N
ov
 20
07
On the AAGL Protocol
M. M. Chowdhury
1. Abstract
Recently the AAGL (Anshel-Anshel-Goldfeld-Lemieux) has been proposed
which can be used for RFID tags. We give algorithms for the problem (we call
the MSCSPv) on which the security of the AAGL protocol is based upon. Hence
we give various attacks for general parameters on the recent AAGL protocol pro-
posed. One of our attack is a deterministic algorithmwhich has space complexity
and time complexity both at least exponential in the worst case. In a better case
using a probabilistic algorithm the time complexity can be O(|XSS(u′i)|
λ5n1+ǫ)
and the space complexity can be O(|XSS(u′i)|
λ6), where the element u′i is part
of a public key, n is the index of braid group, XSS is a summit type set and ǫ
is a constant in a limit. The above shows the AAGL protocol is potentially not
significantly more secure as using key agreement protocols based on the conju-
gacy problem such as the AAG (Anshel-Anshel-Goldfeld) protocol because both
protocols can be broken with complexity which do not significantly differ. We
think our attacks can be improved.
2. Introduction
Recently the AAGL (Anshel-Anshel-Goldfeld-Lemieux) key agreement pro-
tocol using braid groups has been proposed [1] an application of the AAGL
protocol is for RFID tags [1]. There is an instantiation of the AAGL proto-
col in [1] where the AAGL protocol uses braid groups, in all of this paper we
refer to the AAGL protocol when it uses braid groups. In this note we give
an attack which can show the security of the protocol is based on the multiple
simultaneous conjugacy search problem (see definition 1 below). We think our
attack can be improved. Note once z is recovered with our attack then agreed
upon key can be computed with the linear algebraic attack given in [1]. All our
algorithms can work in groups that are not the braid group.
2.1 Hard Problems in Non-abelian Groups.
Definition-The MSCSP (multiple simultaneous conjugacy search problem)
[4] is find elements g ∈ G such that yi = gxig
−1, given the publicly known
information: G is a group, xi, yi ∈ G with xi, yi = axia
−1, 1 ≤ i ≤ u, with the
secret element a ∈ G.
Notation-We refer to an example of the MSCSP as ((x1, x2, ..., xu), (y1, y2, ..., yu))
with solution (g, g−1).
Definition- Consider the following variant of the MSCSP. If (x1, x2, ..., xu) is
unknown in the MSCSP ((x1, x2, ..., xu), (y1, y2, ..., yu)) and we are then to find
the elements g. We refer to the above variant of the MSCSP as the MSCSPv
(MSCSP-variant).
Notation-We refer an example of the MSCSPv as ((x1, x2, ..., xu), (y1, y2, ..., yu))
with solution (g, g−1).
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Definition-The CSP [4] can be defined as the MSCSP with u = 1.
Notation-We refer to an example of the CSP as (x, y) with solution (g, g−1).
Notation-In this paper XSS refers a set that potentially contains one or
more solutions for the MSCSP so XSS can refer to a summit type set such as
SSS.
The security of the AAGL protocol is based on the MSCSPv-this is shown
below. Our attack is an algorithm to solve the MSCSPv. The main purpose
of this paper is using an algorithm of deterministic factorial time and space
complexity or a probabilistic algorithm with time complexity O(E(u′i)n
2) and
space complexity O(E(u′i)) (O(E(u
′
i)) is of at least exponential complexity in
the braid index n and its word lengthW of some braid, so E(u′i) grows at most,
like a power of the factorial of n, O(n!W ), in this paper we refer to O(n!W )
as the abbreviation factorial complexity), it is then to shown the security of
the AAGL protocol is equivalent to solving the MSCSP (and hence the CSP)
instead of the MSCSPv.
Our result is better than all previous results in the connection: it works
for general parameters, that there is only a brute force algorithm (which has
factorial complexity) to solve the MSCSPv and our algorithms are better than
the brute force algorithm. The above factorial complexity algorithm of ours
may use any factorial time algorithm for the CSP, note the best algorithm to
solve the CSP in general has in the worst case factorial running time. Hence
this means the AAGL protocol is no more secure than using the AAG protocol
[2] in the connections:
• We show they are both protocols are based on the MSCSP (so the AAGL
protocol is not strictly based on the MSCSPv as implied in [1]).
• They can both be broken using related deterministic algorithms of factorial
complexity that solve the MSCSP.
• There are related probabilistic algorithms (including our probabilistic al-
gorithm 4) that may break both protocols depending on the parameters used.
3. AAGL Key Agreement Protocol
In the recent [1] AAGL propose a key agreement protocol it differs mainly
from the seminal AAG (Anshel-Anshel-Goldfeld) algebraic protocol given in [2]
because it is based on the MSCSPv, the AAG protocol is based on a system of
conjugacy equations (the MSCSP) [2]. We do not reproduce all details of the
AAGL protocol which can be found in [1] but restrict to the details we require.
Let Bn = {b1, b2, ..., bn−1} be the Artin representation of the braid group on n
strings. In [1] an example of the protocol is given using braid groups the security
is based on the TTP algorithm in [1] given below. e is the identity element in
the braid group.
Algorithm 1- TTP Algorithm of [1].
1. Choose two secret subset BL = {bl1 , ..., blα}, BR = {br1 , ..., brβ} of the
set of generators of Bn where |li − rj | ≥ 2 for all 1 ≤ i ≤ la and 1 ≤ j ≤ rβ .
2. chooses a secret element z ∈ Bn.
3. Choose words {w1, ..., wγ} of bounded length from BL.
2
4. Choose words {v1, ..., vγ} of bounded length from BR.
5. For 1 ≤ i ≤ γ
a. calculate the left normal form zwiz
−1 and reduce the result modulo the
square of the fundamental braid.
b. set w′i equal to the sequence of integers that correspond to the element
calculated in a.
c. calculate the left normal form zviz
−1 and reduce the result modulo the
square of the fundamental braid.
d. set v′i equal to the sequence of integers that correspond to the element
calculated in c.
6. Publish the two sets {w′1, ..., w
′
γ} and {v
′
1, ..., v
′
γ}.
The security of the TTP algorithm is based on the MSCSPv with the ele-
ments (x1, x2, ..., xu) = (w1, ..., wγ , v1, ..., vγ),
(y1, y2, ..., yu) = (w
′
1, ..., w
′
γ , v
′
1, ..., v
′
γ) and u = 2γ. Assume the attacker
knows this instance of the MSCSPv in Artin representation.
3.1 Security of AAGL Protocol is Based on the
Multiple Simultaneous Conjugacy Search Problem
Notation-u′i ∈ {w
′
1, ..., w
′
γ}∪ {v
′
1, ..., v
′
γ}, ui ∈ {w1, ..., wγ}∪ {v1, ..., vγ}, u
′
i ∼
u, for some 1 ≤ i ≤ 2γ.
Notation-Su′i is a set that contains elements of the form zkz
−1 when the set
is used in a deterministic algorithm. Su′
i
contains elements of the form zkz−1
with some probability when the set is used in a probabilistic algorithm. Where
zkz−1are elements in the centraliser of u′i.
Recall the centraliser of an element is the set of all elements that com-
mute with it, for the infinite braid group the centraliser of an element will
contain an infinite number of elements hence we approximate the centraliser
with a finite set. Let λ be a braid invariant, it is possible (but unlikely) for
two different braids have the same value for λ see [6]. Note there are prac-
tical algorithms to compute the braid invariant λ because the CDP (conju-
gacy decision problem) is feasible in braid groups. Good bounds for summit
type sets are not known but the SSS certainly has the upper bound n!q,where
q = max∀i(min sup(u
′
i) + max inf(u
′
i)),for example see [6], so all known algo-
rithms for computing SSS are in the worst case have factorial complexity but it
is conjectured that the size SSS is exponential in n. Because we use the upper
bound n!q our algorithm is of factorial complexity. It is known the quantity
min sup(u′i) + max inf(u
′
i) can be computed in polynomial time and space so q
can be computed in polynomial time and space in n and the length of u′i (ob-
viously this means q can be computed in factorial space and time complexity).
Refinements of Garside’s algorithm for the CSP/CDP [8] (Garside’s is the first
algorithmic solution of CDP/CSP) to solve the CSP such as the solution given
in [7] can be used to solve deterministically the CDP in worst case factorial
time and space complexity. Elements of the form zkz−1 (where k commutes
with ui) may be found by computing the centraliser of u
′
i (which any attacker
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can compute) because zkz−1zuiz
−1 = zuiz
−1zkz−1 ⇒ zkz−1u′i = u
′
izkz
−1 so
zkz−1 is in Su′i .
3.1.1 Attack Based on MSCSP
The only known attack, given in [1], without side information on the AAGL
is a brute force attack the above linear algebraic attack is given in section 6 of
[1]. We give a deterministic algorithm based on computing centralizers to solve
the MSCSPv and our algorithm maybe uses algorithms that compute super
summit sets. Our algorithm has factorial complexity some reasons are because
all known algorithms to compute the centralizer of an element are factorial
complexity (in the worst case)/the best known algorithm to solve the CSP in
general has factorial running time, which means computing centralisers and
solving the CSP can take around the same time. Hence our algorithm is the
best known way to attack the AAGL if suitable parameters can be found/and
potentially its efficiency improved.
Notation-C is an algorithm that computes Su′i in factorial space and time
complexity in a worst case.
Algorithm 2 General deterministic algorithm for MSCSPv.
1. Compute Su′i for u
′
i = zuiz
−1, Su′i contains some or all elements of the
form F = zkz−1 it follows choices for k includes all elements which commute
with ui etc.,Su′i ⊆ SF .
2. For an element u′i in Su′i find k then solve the CSP with (k, zkz
−1) for
(z, z−1). We find k as follows.
2i. Select a function fP which parametrizes in P a finite approximation to
the centralizer u′i.
2ii. Select a function which parametrizes in LP a finite approximation to
words in G. We define by the set ULP as containing all words defined by LP .
3i. Set LP = L0. P = P0. LP may depend on P . Compute if necessary
Su′
i
= fP .
3ii. Update value P as, P ∈ pv. Initialise I = I0.
3iii. Select S′
u′i,LP
⊆ Su′
i
. compute if necessary Su′
i
= fP . S
′
u′i,LP
may
depend on LP . Using a chosen algorithm, find a (CSP) pair (b, a) such that
b ∼ a, a ∈ S′u′i,LP , b ∈ U
′
LP
where U ′LP ⊆ ULP . The pair (b, a) is stored.
3iv. If the values of P have been exhausted from the set pv then goto step
4.
3v. Update value of I as I ∈ iv, if the values of I have been exhausted from
the set iv then goto step 3ii.
3vi. Update LP as LP = LP,I . If the values of LP have not been exhausted
goto step 3iii.
4. Solve the MSCSP for all the pairs (b, a). Terminate algorithm.
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We now give an example of algorithm 2 which is also a general algorithm
(note P is redundant in this example for the reason given in the proof below)
of the above algorithm where G may be Bn or any Garside group.
Algorithm 3 An example of algorithm 2.
1. Compute Su′
i
for u′i = zuiz
−1, Su′
i
contains some or all elements of the
form F = zkz−1 hence for choices of k includes all elements in BR or BL
depending if u′i = v
′
i or u
′
i = w
′
i.
A second possible choice is to compute Su′i represented by a generating set
of the centraliser of u′i such as using the algorithm in [9].
2. Find k then solve the CSP with (k, zkz−1) for (z, z−1). We find k as
follows.
2i. Select a function which parametrizes in P a finite approximation to the
centralizer zuiz
−1. We choose to the function F
u
′
i,P
(P0, α) which computes
the set which contains all braids F ∈ SF in the centralizer of u
′
i such that
∆P 4 F 4 ∆P+1, for ∀P , P0 ≤ P < α, which is ∆
P0 4 F 4 ∆α. SF here
contains at least one element in the centraliser of u′i if using C as described in
the proof below.
2ii. We define the set (we construct) ULP as ULP ⊆ B
+
n \e to contain all
distinct words in Artin of length LP with the length is in the number of Artin
generators. Or a second possible choice for ULP may contain some or all of the
union of the centralisers of short words in Artin generators, so for example, to
compute k is to (where k may be long) choose it from the generating set of the
centraliser of the single Artin generators σi say using the algorithm in [9], the
above approach can be used when k not one Artin generator.
3i. Set LP = 1. P0 = −2gz. P = P0. Let Su′
i
= F
u
′
i,P
(P0, α).
3ii. P = P + 1. I = 1.
3iii. We test the relation using an algorithm for the CDP (an alternative
step instead of this step is described in the proof below)
λ(a) = λ(b), a ∈ S′u′i,LP , b ∈ U
′
LP
where S′
u′i,LP
⊆ Su′
i
,and U ′LP ⊆ ULP , The pair (b, a) are found with a linear
search. If the above relation is true then let k = b. The pair (b, a) is stored.
3iv. If P > P0 + 1 then goto step 4.
3v. I = I + 1. LP,I = I.
3vi. LP = LP,I . If LP > f(u
′
i) then goto step 3ii. Where f(u
′
i) may depend
on u′i .
4. Solve the MSCSP for all the pairs (b, a) using a deterministic algorithm.
Terminate algorithm.
As would be expected, for poorly chosen parameters our algorithm may not
be more efficient than a brute force attack. A potential variant is to check if
a short word in length of Artin generators is not conjugated by z an attacker
can compute then length for a given length function the average (or an upper
bound) length of u′i and if a word u
′
i is significantly larger than the average
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length (or an upper bound) of u′i it is considered not a potential value for a, so
here S′u′i,LP
depends on LP . Other potential variants (which we discuss below)
is some subset SF in the bounds for F such that ∆
P0 4 F 4 ∆δ (so here P may
have a larger range), for some integer δ, and not restrict b to positive words.
The parameters P,LP control the lengths of a and b. We now show for suitable
parameters our attack will terminate with a solution for the MSCSPv used in
the AAGL protocol.
Proposition 1
Solving the MSCSPv as used in the AAGL protocol is equivalent to solving
MSCSP (which can be shown in deterministic factorial time) using algorithm
3 twice and possibly using algorithm C, with the parameters P0 = −2gz, α =
2gz + Lm, f(u
′
i) ≤ O(
n
log(n) ) where Lm = max∀P LP . As is shown in the proof
Lm = 1 is sufficient. This requires in the worst case, space complexity
O(c1|SSS(u
′
i)|+ c2|SSS(b)|+ (n− 1)
O( n
log(n)
))
and time complexity
O(|SSS(b)||SSS(u′i)|(n− 1)
O( n
log(n)
))
. Where the element u′i is part of the TTP’s public key and b ∈ Sv′i ∪ Sw′j .
Proof
We use algorithm that computes summit type sets we call XSS we analyze
the cases for XSS, SSS and C both in the proof below.
• Case using C and SSS.
We use an algorithm C such that it computes ∆P0 4 F 4 ∆α for all P used.
For C we use an existing algorithm for the centraliser or the CSP. infss(u
′
i) means
elements of the SS which have maximum infinimum of the conjugacy class of
u′i. For example we use the algorithm to compute the SS [8] to solve the CSP
(u′i, u
′
i) then it follows for ∀F ∈ SF , ∆
P0 4 F ≺ ∆P0+1 where P0 = infss(u
′
i) and
the SS can be computed in worst case factorial complexity, so P is redundant
in this case, but here inf(zkz−1) = infss(u
′
i) must be true for the algorithm to
find a solution. Another choice for Su′i involves computing all braids F,
∆P0 4 F 4 ∆α (1)
then it would follows from the analysis and the bound on the number of braids
in canonical factors and the braid index [3] our algorithm would be of factorial
complexity but this choice of parameters for the algorithm results in complexity
similar to a brute force algorithm. The above method using 1 can be potentially
improved for example if k (described below) is short length, then depending on
the method of rewriting elements, F is expected of short length hence the value
of α can be lowered.
In the following analysis we assume the algorithm C is used to compute F ∈
Su′
i
, with F in the bounds given by 1, for all P used or the choice for computing
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Su′i above or we assume our analysis below we use the SSS based algorithm
of [7] which has worst case factorial time and factorial space complexity. If C
computes Su′
i
contains at least one element of the form zkz−1 is used then our
algorithm always terminates with a solution using the bounds for P0,α derived
below.
We prove below that computing ULP has worst case factorial time and fac-
torial space complexity. Note if it is true at least for a class of braids for a value
of XSS that |XSS| is exponential in n in the proof below then the algorithm
works in worst case exponential time (hence the term O( nlog(n) ) appears below).
From [1] any attacker can compute the smallest gz from
gz
ln(2n− 2)
ln(2)
≥ m
where gz is the length of z in it Artin generators and we assume the smallest
gz is used. If the above assumption turns out to be false then the attacker may
estimate gz from the elements u
′
i, gz can be feasibly computed otherwise the
public keys are too long in Artin generators to use.
We use the easy theorem 1.5 given in [7] which is if B is any braid word
represented in N negative Artin generators P positive Artin generators and then
∆N 4 B 4 ∆P . Consider then for any b ∈ ULP , and z then ∆
−gz 4 z 4 ∆gz , e
4 b 4 ∆Lp , hence
∆−2gz 4 zbz−1 4 ∆2gz+Lp
hence if we let P0 = −2gz, α = 2gz + Lp < 2gz + Lm from the above bound on
zbz−1 then it must be true that the centraliser of u′i contains elements of the
form zkz−1 where k is an element in BL or BR.
Note |SF | by assumption is of factorial complexity in the parameters 2gz+Lp,
n and contains zkz−1 for values of k.
This is true because we know from the condition |li − rj | ≥ 2 it follows that
BL and BR do not have any generator in common.
Now the attacker runs the algorithm 3 twice in parallel so that u′i = v
′
i or u
′
i =
w′j in each the runs but the attacker may compute the common computations
(such as computing ULP ) once in each of the runs. Hence for L = 1 one of the
choices of b (selected by the attacker) is one of the Artin generators of BR
must be a correct choice, generally this means for k there are lα + rβ easy to
guess when it is of feasibly computable length from the parameters suggested
in [1]. Such easy choices for k exist because the TTP algorithm specifies the
subgroup in terms of single Artin generators. The attacker using linear search
algorithm, through Sv′i ∪ Sw′j for zkz
−1 and using the CDP with b a word in a
single Artin generator of up length n in step 3iii finds the CSP pair (b, zbz−1)
to solve which must exist by construction. An option at step 3iii is to solve the
CDP in deterministic factorial time using the algorithm in [7].
We estimate |ULp | with the upper bound Sn,LP = (n−1)
LP hence Sn,O( n
log(n)
)
is at worst an exponential function. Hence computing all distinct words (which
are not optimally bounded above exponentially by Sn,LP ) of length θ = O(
n
log(n) )
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from U ′LP will mean the attacker is guaranteed to find all the words (there are
an exponential amount of these and if θ = O(log(n)) they are a polynomial
long) in BL,BR of length θ in Sv′
i
∪ Sw′
j
.
Hence the attacker can take 1 ≤ Lp ≤ O(
n
log(n) ), as this keeps the complexity
exponential so the attacker selects LP up to O(
n
log(n)) (actually the attacker can
select any θ such that the complexity of the algorithm is factorial in the worst
case). To get more conjugacy equations the attacker can try for b all words
of length O( nlog(n) ) but as expected the longer the word length of b is the less
chance (as described below) that a CSP pair will be found but for short word
length of b there is a non-negligible probability that the attacker can guess a
correct b. We show below that 1 ≤ L ≤ O(log n) can be chosen.
In the following θ = O( nlog(n) ). Let c1, c2..., λ1, λ2, ... ∈ ℜ, we assume
we may approximate Su′i and centraliser computations by O(|XSS(u
′
i)|) this
assumption is based on the fact that in some cases, e.g. XSS = SSS, it is known
algorithms to computing the centraliser of u′i are proportional in space and time
complexity to |XSS(u′i)|. |Su′i | and hence any centraliser is at most of space
factorial complexity using (2.1) above. SSS(u′i) is the super summit set of the
element u′i the size of these sets are not fully known it is known that |SSS| to be
at least exponential in n, for a fixed n is proportional to (n!)q, we write SSS(u′i)
for the maximum size of SSS(u′i) where q = max∀imin sup(u
′
i) + max inf(u
′
i).
Observe O((n!)q) is of smaller order than O(eqn log(n)) we use a similar notation
for XSS(u′i).
If we use an algorithm that stores at least all the elements in Sv′
i
∪ Sw′
j
and stores all elements in ULP , uses an deterministic algorithm to solve both
the MSCSP (the number of equations ν in the MSCSP may be constant) and
CDP that uses exponential space, then the space complexity of the algorithm
is factorial in the worst case it is
O(c1E(u
′
i) + c2E(b) + c3(n− 1)
θ)
= O(c4|SSS(u
′
i)|+ c5|SSS(b)|+ (n− 1)
O( n
log(n)
))
≈ O(c6e
q log(n) + c7e
q2 log(n) + c8ω
n)
where the constant ω depends on the function used for O( nlog(n) ).
Note the space and time complexity of solving the MSCSP is proportional
to ν|SSS(b)| if the MSCSP solved by intersections of elements of summit sets.
We write O(|SSS(b)|) ≈ O(E(b)) = O(eq2n log(n)) as the maximum size of
SSS(b) which is determined by q2 = maxb∈U ′
LP
min sup(b)+max inf(b), so q2 is
the canonical length of b.
We use this result at step 3iii in the CDP. Computing Sv′i ∪ Sw′j , the linear
searches through Sv′i ∪ Sw′j for each element of ULP and solving the CDP for
every potential pair at 3iii, and then solving the resulting MSCSP means in the
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worst case the time complexity is factorial and it is
O(c1E(u
′
i) + c2E(u
′
i)E(b)(n− 1)
θ)
≈ O(E(b)E(u′i)(n− 1)
O( n
log(n)
))
= O(E(b)E(u′i)ω
n) = O(|SSS(b)||SSS(u′i)|ω
n)
≈ O((ωe(q+q2) log(n))n)
It is understood the constants c1, c2... are different from the constants c1, c2...
used in the notation of the space complexity and other complexity computations
below. Now consider a variant of the above attack, which is not use an algorithm
for the CDP in step 3iii but instead solves the CSP with the guess for b with
every possible element in S′
u′i,LP
and recovers z and hence the shared secret
using the algorithm in [1], the attacker may test if z is the correct solution: for
example, z is used in an impersonation attack or if (using an algorithm for the
CDP) z−1u′iz ∼ u
′
i. For the variant attack above the worst case space and time
complexity are the same.
•XSS Case.
In the more general case of XSS we can use any algorithm we refer to as
S that and outputs for a conjugate pair (b, a) or potential pair (b, a) using the
sets Sv′i , Sw′j , U
′
LP
, let St,u′i , Ss,u′i be the time complexity and space complexity
respectively to compute Su′
i
, we refer to the time complexity and space com-
plexity to solve the CDP as CDPt, CDPs, we refer to an algorithm for CDP
with input b, a as CDP (b, a) similar notation for MSCSP. Note it is assumed
the CDP and MSCSP can be solved in worst case time complexity and space
complexity proportional to |XSS|, this is true for example when XSS = SSS
and the assumption is based on this example. By a similar argument to the
SSS a time complexity bound in the worst case is,
O(St,v′i + St,w′j + max∀P∈pv,b∈U ′LP
CDPt(S(Sv′i ∪ Sw′j , b)) +MSCSPt)
≈ O(c1|XSS(u
′
i)|
λ1 + c2|XSS(b)|)
A bound for the space complexity in worst case is
O(Ss,v′i + Ss,w′j + U
′
s,Lm
+MSCSPs + max
∀P∈pv,a∈Sv′
i
∪Sw′
j
max
b∈U ′
LP
CDPs(b, a))
≈ O(c1|XSS(u
′
i)|
λ2 + c2|SSS(b)|+ c3|U
′
LP
|).
Now consider a variant of the above attack, which is not use an algorithm for
the CDP in step 3iii but instead solves the CSP with the guess for b with every
possible element in S′
u′i,LP
and recovers z and hence the shared secret using the
algorithm in [1], the attacker may test if z is the correct solution: for example,
z is used in an impersonation attack or if z−1u′iz ∼ u
′
i.
Note it may be that b ∈ S′
u′i,LP
(which can be verified using a polynomial
time word algorithm in Bn), in this case z must be in the centraliser of b, call
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the set of all such stored b, Bz and so z can be found by testing every element
(for the choice of z) of the centraliser of a subset of Bz for the correct element.
If Su′
i
is computed using the second choice in step 1 and the corresponding
value of k is found using the second choice in step 2ii then because it is known
the centraliser of every element in Bn can be generated by O(n
2) generators
hence the MSCSPv can be solved feasibly depending on |SSS| [9].
Algorithm 4- Probabilistic algorithm for MSCSPv.
1. Compute Su′i a suitably small Su′i,s of u
′
i = zuiz
−1 that may contain
elements of the form F = zkz−1 hence for choices of k includes all elements in
BR or BL depending if u′i = v
′
i or u
′
i = w
′
i. One possible simple choice at this
step is to compute Su′i as randomly chosen elements of the centraliser of u
′
i.
2. Find k then solve the CSP with (k, zkz−1) for (z, z−1). We find k as
follows.
2i. Select a function which parametrizes in P a suitably small finite approx-
imation to the centralizer zuiz
−1. We choose the function Fu′i,P
(P0, α) which
computes the set which contains a subset of the braids F ∈ SF and if possible
maybe using heuristic method(s) gives F where k is short (in a given length
function) with high probability.
2ii. We define the set we can feasibly compute ULP as ULP ⊆ Bn of short
words in length LP for some length function.
3i. Set LP = 1. P0 = −2gz. P = P0. Let Su′i = Fu′i,P
(P0, α).
3ii. P = P + 1. I = 1.
3iii. We test the relation using an efficient algorithm to solve the CDP such
as the one in [6]
λ(a) = λ(b), a ∈ S′u′i,LP , b ∈ U
′
LP
where S′u′i,LP
⊆ Su′i ,and U
′
LP
⊆ ULP . If the above relation is true then let
k = b. The pair (b, a) is stored. When enough pairs have been computed goto
step 4.
3iv. I = I + 1.
3v. LP,I = I.
3vi. LP = LP,I . If P > P0 then terminate then goto 4. If LP > f(u
′
i) then
goto step 3ii. Where f(u′i) may depend on u
′
i we can take it to be on feasibly
computable words up to O( nlog(n)).
4. Solve the MSCSP for all the pairs (b, a) using an algorithm that works
with high probability. Terminate algorithm.
Proposition 2
Solving the MSCSPv can be done with the probabilistic algorithm 4, in ap-
proximately, time O(|XSS(u′i)|
λ3ωn) and space O(c3|XSS(u
′
i)|
λ4 + c1ω
n), and
with additional reasonable assumptions this can be improved to time O(|XSS(u′i)|
λ5n1+ǫ)
and space O(|XSS(u′i)|
λ6) using algorithms to solve the MSCSP, CDP effi-
ciently, where the element u′i is part of the TTP’s public key, XSS is a summit
type set and the constant ω depends on n.
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Proof
The following easy computations involved in computing the complexity in
the better case: a randomly chosen generator has probability pα =
lα
n−2 and
pβ =
rβ
n−2 of being in BL and BR respectively, then an attacker can selects
a random word b from U ′LP using in length of θ Artin generators then it has
pα,β,θ =
1
pθα
+ 1
pθ
β
probability of being in BL or BR. From the algorithm used
to compute Su′i (which computes words less than a certain bound) we do not
have to pick θ too large there exist some k of short length in Artin generators.
Choosing θ ≤ n as this keeps the algorithm in factorial complexity but this is not
a good choice, from the above discussion the attacker can take θ = O( nlog(n) ).
Observe the attacker must on average compute
⌈
Wp−1α,β,θ
⌉
<
(n− 2)θ
min(lα, rβ)θ
(2)
before expecting W words to be found in Sv′
i
∪Sw′
j
. The attacker may estimate
pα, pβ if the attacker assumes lα, rβ , n are not independent of each other,
for example lα ≈ rβ and assumes all (then pα,β,1 = 1 for the selection of b
used in both runs) or nearly all possible Artin generators are used in BL,BR so
pα ≈ pβ. Hence (independent of large enough n), the attacker needs to compute
approximately as few as 2θ distinct words for the parameters suggested in [1]
to ensure on average a reduction to the MSCSP with at least 2 equations. We
would need to select only approximately 4 distinct random words of length 3
from U ′LP before the attacker expects to get one conjugacy equation or the CSP,
the example above use little memory and potentially little computing power.
In this better case we use an efficient algorithm for the CDP such as the one
given in [6], use a linear search, and use an algorithm for the MSCSP that works
with high probability. We assume in all of this second proof, the length of b is
less than ui, this means in general O(|SSS(ui)|) is greater than O(|SSS(b)|).
We assume in this proof there is an algorithm that can compute Su′
i
pro-
portional in space and time complexity to |XSS|, this assumption is based on
the fact that such an algorithm exists when XSS = SSS see [9], and that this
algorithm has worst time space and time exponential complexity. From the de-
scription above (from
⌈
Wp−1
α,β,O( n
log(n)
)
⌉
< O(nO(
n
log(n)
))), the time complexity
in this better case is O(|XSS(u′k)|
λ3ωn) as shown below. We assume we use an
algorithm for the CDP which has time and space proportional to |XSS| such as
Garside’s algorithm [8]. Here CDPt is the average time taken to solve the CDP
over all pairs (b, a). Then by a similar argument to above the time complexity
is
O(St,v′
i
+ St,w′
j
+ CDPt(|(Sv′
i
)|+ |Sw′
j
|)ωn +MSCSPt)
≈ O(E(u′i)O(n
O( n
log(n)
)))
= O(|XSS(u′k)|
λ3ωn)
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also the space complexity is
O(Ss,v′i + Ss,w′j + c1ω
n + max
∀P∈pv,a∈Sv′
i
∪Sw′
j
max
b∈U ′LP
CDPs(b, a) +MSCSPs)
= O(c2E(u
′
i) +O(n
O( n
log(n)
)))
≈ O(c3|XSS(u
′
k)|
λ4 + c4ω
n)
where the constant ω depends on the function used for O( nlog(n) ).
•Better Complexity Bounds
The above analysis for the better case is may not be optimal, for example if
we make some assumptions then we get a tighter bound on the complexities as
follows. For this case it the average complexities for algorithm for the CDP,CSP
and MSCSP are considered. From the from 2 and if we assume lα, rβ are linear
in n and θ = O(log(n)), we assume we have an efficient algorithm for the
CDP which has average linear complexity possibly the one given in [5], this
assumption is based on the result that empirically for randomly chosen long
random braids which have simple elements randomly chosen the |USS| is on
average likely to be linear in the word length and independent of the braid
index n e.g. see [5], and use an algorithm for the MSCSP that works with high
probability. Hence the CDP/CSP in this average case can be solved in linear
space and time complexity. The time complexity in this better case can be with
high probability be (recall computing Su′i that in proportional in space an time
complexity to |XSS|)
O(c1E(u
′
i)ß
O(log n)O(n)) ≈ O(E(u′i)n
1+ǫ)
= O(|XSS(u′i)|
λ5n1+ǫ)
for some ß∈ ℜ which depends on 2. The space complexity in this better case is
O(c1E(u
′
i) + ß
O(logn) + Ss,v′i + Ss,w′j )
≈ O(c1E(u
′
i) + c2n
ǫ) ≈ O(|XSS(u′i)|
λ6)
using straightforward algebra it can be shown ǫ can be close to a constant as n
is larger and depends on ß and the constants in O(log n), if ß is bounded then
ǫ is bounded.
Note the space can be up to exponential size (so giving a better space bound
here) the only requirement is the set Su′
i
must be of at least size greater than
one as it must contain at least one element with some feasible computable k.
The above shows using the AAGL protocol can potentially be as secure
than using CSP based protocols such as the AAG protocol [2] as both can be
broken with attacks of the same or similar complexity depending on the values
λ5, λ6 and ǫ, by similar we mean our instantiations of our attack can differ by
a factor of a polynomial in n from attacks such as on the AAG protocol, for
example the time complexities of attack differ by a factor of n1+ǫ. If the attacker
decides to compute Su′
i
as randomly elements chosen elements of the centraliser
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of u′i then the success of this attack in this case depends on the probability
of Su′i containing elements of the form zkz
−1. Informally, or attack consists
of computing subset of centralisers and extracting suitable elements from the
centralisers: we refer to our attack as a two central element attack.
Now consider a variant of the above attack, which is not use an algorithm for
the CDP in step 3iii but instead solves the CSP with the guess for b with every
possible element in S′u′i,LP
and recovers z and hence the shared secret using the
algorithm in [1], the attacker may test if z is the correct solution: for example,
z is used in an impersonation attack or if z−1u′iz ∼ u
′
i.
Note it may be that b ∈ S′u′i,LP
(which may be verified using a polynomial
time word algorithm in Bn), in this case z must be in the centraliser of b, call
the set of all such stored b, bz and so z can be found by testing every element
of the centraliser of a subset of bz for the correct element.
Observe if the attacker assumes his guess of the generators of BL ,BR are
correct (or manages know these subgroups in a different way) the attacker can
compute randomly chosen words computable in polynomial time in BL,BR and
in up to factorial time (in approximately the time taken to solve the CDP) find
a system of conjugacy equation / reduce the security of the AAGL protocol to
the MSCSP so this is another reason why the users should keep the subgroups
BL,BR secret. For general BR and BL the algorithm has to be modified to
use the publicly known information about their structures. The complexity of
the algorithm is mainly determined by computing Sv′
i
, Sw′
j
which may contain
portions of the centralisers, so we can estimate this to be approximately the
same time and space complexity of computing the SSS of an element so in
general it is exponential, also the size of the sets S′
u′i,LP
and U ′LP affect the
complexity of the example algorithm in this connection O1
O1 =
∑
P, ∀P∈pv
∑
I, ∀I∈iv
|S′u′i,LP,I |+ |U
′
LP,I
|+ |pv||iv|
=
−2gz∑
P=P0
f(u′i)∑
I=1
|S′u′i,LP,I |+ |U
′
LP,I
|+ f(u′i)
will make the example algorithm can be used as a parameter to measure the
efficiency of algorithm 3, minimising O1 will make the algorithm more efficient.
Generally in our probabilistic algorithm we could use an heuristic optimization
algorithm instead of a linear search if we do this then we suggest trying the dif-
ferential evolution algorithm because it is known to be fairly fast and reasonably
robust [12]. The components of the vectors used in the differential evolution al-
gorithm depending on L and LP the differential evolution means in general the
components of the trial vector will not increase linearly so this means in steps
3ii, 3iv will not be increased linearly as is done in the probabilistic algorithm.
Algorithm-5 To Recover BL and BR.
With a little more work we give an attack that recovers the secret subgroups
BL and BR. Any attacker can compute for i, j for sufficiently many i and j
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using the attack above (to recover z) vi, wj the attacker checks for the generator
br, 1 ≤ r ≤ n if
wibr = brwi for all i (3)
vjbr = brvj for all j. (4)
If 3 is true then br is a generator of BR similarly if 4 is true then br is a generator
of BL.
Algorithm 6-To modify our attack to solve the general MSCSPv.
1. For the MSCSPv ((v1, v2, ..., vu), (v
′
1, v
′
2, ..., v
′
u)) compute a suitable finite
approximation Z of the centralisers of the set of elements (v′1, v
′
2, ..., v
′
u).
2. Find elements in Z such that the elements are conjugated by g (we refer to
such elements as the system of conjugacy equations ((w1, w2, ..., wu), (w
′
1, w
′
2, ..., w
′
u)))
such that the sets (v1, v2, ..., vu), (w1, w2, ..., wu) are commuting.
3. Solve the MSCSPv using a version of algorithm 2 with the pair of MSCSPv
((v1, v2, ..., vu), (v
′
1, v
′
2, ..., v
′
u)), ((w1, w2, ..., wu), (w
′
1, w
′
2, ..., w
′
u)).
Here vi, wi are chosen from the subgroups BL and BR respectively. Note if
the structure of BL and BR is known then this may be used in our determin-
istic algorithm. Combinations of centraliser elements and their inverses of the
conjugated generators may be computed to attempt to construct shorter words
k. In an example of the above algorithm it may feasible to compute one or more
of the elements v1, v2, ..., vu possibly using the relation λ(v
′
i) = λ(v˘i) where v˘i
is the guess for vi, and hence reducing to the MSCSP there.
3.2 Defending Against Attacks
The attacks may be avoided if
1) Ensure if possible that elements of the centralisers of u′i are hard with the
CSP (k, zkz−1).
2) Ensure if possible that elements of the centralisers of the form zkz−1 of
u′i , that the element k cannot be feasibly computed.
3) To maximize the value O1, with the constraint of making MSCSPv as
difficult as possible for the attacker.
4) The TTP algorithm may be modified with different choices for BL,BR so
that larger generators are used with the constraint of the computing platform.
5) The security of the AAGL protocol is based on the complexity of algorithm
C not being efficient and C may be based on the following problem which is
problem 1 given in [10],
given g1, ..., gk ∈ G compute C(g1, ..., gk)
here (g1, ..., gk) = (u
′
1, ..., u
′
γ) and C(g1, ..., gk) = C(g1) ∩ C(g2) ∩ ...C(gk).
4. Potential Length Based Algorithm for MSCSPv
We show that modified a known basic length attack for example see [11] can
be used to for the general MSCSPv and then any algorithm can be used to solve
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the MSCSP such as a known length attack such as [11]. We refer to our length
based MSCSP algorithm the length-MSCSPv algorithm. Suppose we are given
an example of the MSCSPv.
Compute the centralizer of zwiz
−1 or a portion of this set we call Sw′i then
Sw′
i
contains all elements of the form F = zkz−1 it follows choices for k includes
all elements in BL for a suitable approximation of the centraliser. Hence the
generators we peel from F in our length attack are the generators of the cen-
tralisers of w′i. For example in B4 one of the generators of the centraliser of the
element σ41σ2σ3 is σ
2
1σ2σ1σ3σ
−2
2 σ
−3
1 and the above generator is of length 10.
Algorithm 7-Length-MSCSPv.
Run step 1 and 2 of algorithm 6 for step 3 use the algorithm below instead
of a version of algorithm 2.
Compute
r′i = zriz
−1ztiz
−1zr−1i z
−1 = zritir
−1
i z
−1
where the words ri and ti are a word in the generators wi. Note an element of
the form zriz
−1 may be used instead for r′i.
1. Select a length function l. Construct r′i as a word in the generators w
′
i for
some 1 ≤ i ≤ nw. A is set to the identity element. Set the iteration n to zero.
Computes a subset Cr of the generator set of the intersection of the centralisers
generator sets, Cr ⊆ ( C(v
′
1)∩ ...∩C(v
′
ac
)), ac = 1 is sufficient, we may also try
and compute the length of the generators of Cr with suitably long generators.
2. Select suitable elements sn ∈ Cr. If
r(r′1, ..., r
′
aw
, sn)  r(r
′
1, ..., r
′
nw
, e)
where is a linear ordering (or an objective function) on a vector of real numbers
[11] and each element of the tuple r(r′1, ..., r
′
nw
, sn) except the last is given by
the corresponding number l(s−1n r
′
isn).
3. Update the word A as
An+1 = Ansn.
The algorithm stops at this part when depending on r(r′1, ..., r
′
nw
, sn) and the
stopping criteria (there can be more than one stopping criteria) then goes to
step 6. The algorithm stops with some probability ρ with A = zr¯i = rˆi and
this braid is stored, where r¯i = riCi for some Ci ∈ G, in other words A is the
product of z and a partial factor of ri we call r¯i.
4. Update the element r′i as
r′i = s
−1
n r
′
isn
5. n = n+ 1. Goto 2.
6. Repeat steps 1 to 5 aw times (obviously with a different choice(s) elements
r′i 1 ≤ i ≤ aw and maybe a different choice for the integer aw).
7. Steps 1 to 6 are repeated again av times but with v
′
i in place of w
′
i and
w′i in place of v
′
i using a system of nv equations.
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8. We now have stored two sets we refer to as BV and BW .
{zw¯1, zw¯2..., zw¯aw} = {wˆ1, ..., wˆaw} = BW
{zv¯1,zv¯2..., zv¯av} = {vˆ1, ..., vˆav} = BV
9. If follows from the MSCSPv example that w¯I v¯J = v¯Iw¯J for any I or J . The
attacker picks I and J and computes
M1 = vˆ
−1
I wˆJ = v¯
−1
I z
−1zw¯J = w¯J v¯
−1
I and Y = wˆJ vˆ
−1
I = zw¯J v¯
−1
I z
−1
hence the attacker can solves the CSP (M1, Y ) for (z, z
−1). Similarly
M2 = vˆIwˆ
−1
J = v¯Iz
−1zw¯−1J = w¯
−1
J v¯I
the CSP an solves the CSP (M2, Y
−1) for (z, z−1). Repeating the above for
similar computations for different I, J builds up a system of conjugacy equations
hence this reduces the MSCSPv to the MSCSP.
The algorithm is a modification of known length attack because we use
the generators of the whole conjugated word zriz
−1 and not just as usual the
generators of z, conjugated element with a partial factor of ri is recovered and
intermediate partial factors involving the secret are recovered and used not as
usual the secret element.
A simple stopping criteria is for some C
r(t1, ..., taw , e) < C < r(r
′
1, ..., r
′
aw
, e)
stop when
r(r′i, sn) < C
and r(t1, ..., taw , e) is to be estimated by the attacker using the value of L given
in [1].
At step 3 we could solve the equation zr¯i for z which may be easier than
solving the MSCSP instead and so we do not need to run all the steps, to be
precise the algorithm is.
Algorithm 8 Length-MSCSPv.
Run step 1 and 2 of algorithm 6 for step 3 use the algorithm below instead
of a version of algorithm 2.
Compute
r′i = zriz
−1ztiz
−1zr−1i z
−1 = zritir
−1
i z
−1
where the words ri and ti are a word in the generators wi. Note an element of
the form zriz
−1 may be used instead for r′i.
1. Select a length function l. Construct r′i as a word in the generators w
′
i for
some 1 ≤ i ≤ nw. A is set to the identity element. Set the iteration n to zero.
Computes a subset Cr of the generator set of the intersection of the centralisers
generator sets, Cr ⊆ ( C(v
′
1)∩ ...∩C(v
′
ac
)), ac = 1 is sufficient, we may also try
and compute the length of the generators of Cr with suitably long generators.
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2. Select suitable elements sn ∈ Cr. If
r(r′1, ..., r
′
aw
, sn)  r(r
′
1, ..., r
′
nw
, e)
where is a linear ordering (or an objective function) on a vector of real numbers
[11] and each element of the tuple r(r′1, ..., r
′
nw
, sn) except the last is given by
the corresponding number l(s−1n r
′
isn).
3. Update the word A as
An+1 = Ansn.
The algorithm stops at this part when depending on r(r′1, ..., r
′
nw
, sn) and the
stopping criteria (there can be more than one stopping criteria) then goes to
step 6. The algorithm stops with some probability ρ2 with A = zr¯i = rˆi and
this braid is stored, where r¯i = riCi for some Ci ∈ G, in other words A is the
product of z and a partial factor of ri we call r¯i.
4. Update the element r′i as
r′i = s
−1
n r
′
isn
5. n = n+ 1. Goto 2.
6. Repeat steps 1 to 5 aw times (obviously with a different choice(s) elements
r′i 1 ≤ i ≤ aw and maybe a different choice for the integer aw).
7. Steps 1 to 6 may be repeated again av times but with v
′
i in place of w
′
i
and w′i in place of v
′
i using a system of nv equations.
8. We now have stored one set or two sets we refer to as BV and BW .
{zw¯1, zw¯2..., zw¯aw} = {wˆ1, ..., wˆaw} = BW
{zv¯1,zv¯2..., zv¯av} = {vˆ1, ..., vˆav} = BV
Using another algorithm we use the elements in BW or BV and solve for z one
of the simplest choices at this step is given an element of BW or BV find w¯i or
v¯i by brute force and hence compute z by using a right multiplication.
5. Attack Using Conjugacy Extractor Functions
5.1 First Attack using CE Functions
In the TTP algorithm above given in [1] step 2 is “chooses a secret element
z ∈ Bn” a user could implement this step 2 as z is chosen from a publicly known
subgroup of Bn we show that this implementation means a CE (conjugacy
extraction) function [13] can be given. It is not given in [1] to not pick z from
a publicly known subgroup. The attack is as follows.
1. Let z ∈ R where R = {α1, ..., αk} is a publicly known subgroup of Bn. In
this step it is required the attacker just needs to find one element that commutes
with z and not with all possible choices of ui (using a chosen algorithm by the
attacker) to show the AAGL protocol is based on the MSCSP one way to find
such elements is as follows. The attacker picks a subgroup of R given by the
generators g1, ..., gk. Then the attacker computes all of or a large part of
S = C(α1, ..., αk) = C(α1) ∩ ...C(αk).
17
2.Then
CE(SI , u
′
i) = u
′
iSIu
′−1
i = zuiz
−1SIzu
−1
i z
−1 = zuiSIu
−1
i z
−1,
will be true if SI does not commute with ui. SI ∈ S, 1 ≤ I ≤ M . The the
protocol can be based on the MSCSP with
((S1, S2, ..., SM ), (CE(S1, u
′
i), CE(S2, u
′
i), ..., CE(Su, u
′
i))) with solution (o, o
−1), o = zui.
and z can be found by computing (o−1u′i)
−1 = z.
As a variant of the above algorithm an attacker may try to compute an
element S
′
I ∈ C(u
′
j) then it may be possible to use S
′
I instead of SI in the
attack above where u
′
j 6= u
′
i, so in this variant knowledge of z being chosen from
a subgroup is not required.
5.2 Second Attack using CE Functions
This attack reveals partial information about the secret z.
1. The attacker picks elements VI according to some criteria for example
elements VI may be picked randomly or VI may be composed of a few Artin
generators as these may commute to some degree with z.
2. Then for 1 ≤ I ≤M for a sequence of integers TI
CEI(SI , u
′
TI
) = u′TISIu
′−1
TI
= zuTIz
−1SIzu
−1
TI
z−1 = zuTIz
−1SIzu
−1
TI
z−1
where z is a partial factor of z with probability ρ3 for some I this means z =
zTIzTI .
3. We solve for each I the CSP (SI , zuTIz
−1) and hence compute zTI =
((zuTIz
−1)−1zuTIz
−1)−1
4. We now and find z using the information (SI , zu
−1
TI
z, zTI ) and the other
information used in the protocol. One of the simplest choices to implement this
step is trying to find zTI for each I by brute force.
A variant of the above attack is after zTI is recovered is to repeat at the
attack (at least once) by iterating with z−1TI u
′
TI
zTI instead of u
′
TI
(and obviously
all other values may be different) so in this way we may be able to find a bigger
factor of z. It may be true some probability ρ4 that z contains a partial factor
of uTI which means the CSP is solved to give zTIuTI where uTI is some partial
factor of uTI . Then the simplest choice at this step to recover z is to find uTI
by brute force and use uTI to recover z. Note this attack is easily modified to
solve the decompostion problem which means using a product of three elements
instead of u′TI .
Again another conjugacy extractor (see [13]) (i.e. this will show the AAGL
protocol is based on the MSCSP again). The user may try computations of the
form (following the notation of [1]) ApublicαA
−1
public, A
−1
publicβApublic, BpublicγB
−1
public, B
−1
publicδBpublic
where A,B,C,D are chosen from α ∈ B, β ∈ NB, γ ∈ A, δ ∈ NA . The infor-
mation recovered from the MSCSP above may be used in attack such as for
example the following attack. Then once an element of the form may be found
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z ⋆ (xai1 (t), sai1 )⋆ ...)⋆ (xaiµ (t), saiµ )⋆ z
−1 then an element such as (na, id) may
be found and so the shared secret can be computed. We will give further details
of this attack. To resist the above attack the public elements should be chosen
so that they do not have an inverse.
6. An algorithm for the MSCSP
Consider the MSCSP ((x1, x2, ..., xu), (y1, y2, ..., yu)) with solution (g, g
−1).
Suppose xi ∈ A, g ∈ B, with A = 〈a1, a2, ..., aM 〉 , B = 〈b1, b2, ..., bN 〉 Compute
a large part of all of the centraliser
D = C(b1, ..., bN) = C(b1) ∩ ...C(bN ).
The we can compute the CE functions
CEk(dk, yi) = yidy
−1
i = gxidkx
−1
i g
−1.
This means we have transformed the MSCSP into another MSCSP. We can use
this transformed MSCSP to attack the protocol in [2], e.g. we may use the
transformed MSCSP as part of another algorithm that solves the MSCSP such
as a length attack, such a length attack is as follows.
1. Select a length function l. A is set to the identity element. Set the
iteration n to zero. Computes a large part or all of the centraliser D.
2. While (Criteria=True)
{
Select elements sn ∈ B.
Compute
CEk = CEk(dk, yi) = yidy
−1
i = gxidkx
−1
i g
−1.
for some 1 ≤ k ≤ I for some I, dk ∈ D.
r(CE1, ..., CEI , sn)  r(CE1, ..., CEI , e)
where is a linear ordering (or an objective function) on a vector of real numbers
[11] and each element of the tuple (CE1, ..., CEI , sn) except the last is given by
the corresponding number l(s−1n CEksn).
}End While.
3. Update the word A as
An+1 = Ansn.
The algorithm stops at this part when depending on r(r′1, ..., r
′
nw
, sn) and the
stopping criteria (there can be more than one stopping criteria) then goes to
step 6. The algorithm stops with some probability ρ3.
4. Update the element CEk using
s−1n CEksn
5. n = n+ 1. Goto 2.
19
6. Output A.
One choice at step 2 is to select sn as choices from all the generators of B,
then choice for the Criteria at step 2 is to increase I using a chosen algorithm
until it is decided peeling occurs for one of the N choices (we try all N choices)
from B for sn: if peeling is still undecided then the algorithm can pick a gener-
ator randomly or stops. We may include in step 2 the equations yi to peel from
in the above.
7. Conclusion
The above attacks needs to be investigated further, because large parts of
the centraliser for an element can be computed (but in general it is difficult
to compute all elements in the centraliser) and we think the attacks can be
improved. Not considering a brute force algorithm (which is shown in [1] that
the AAGL protocol is secure from a brute force algorithm) we have given the
only deterministic algorithm to break the AAGL protocol. We have given an
algorithms for the MSCSPv is and shown can be reduced to solving the MSCSP
using an algorithm of exponential complexity. Further work is
•To implement our deterministic attack or a variant of it for example, try
randomised and/or genetic algorithms (for example these can be used to in-
crease the probabilities ρ, ρi), evolutionary algorithms (e.g. differential evolu-
tion) which lead to more probabilistic solutions (an attacker can try our attack
even if it is in worst case of exponential complexity).
• To minimize O1 possibly with additional heuristics in algorithm 4.
• Try different length attacks apart from the basic length algorithm (which
we have used) in the length-MSCSPv algorithms and to try different refine-
ments for the above length algorithm these include randomised and/or genetic
algorithms which lead to more probabilistic solutions. To test/implement the
length-MSCSPv algorithms to give experimental results for its success for dif-
ferent parameters. The length-MSCSPv algorithms we have given can be used
as the basis of other length-MSCSPv algorithms.
• As described in the attack given in section 5 it is sufficient to find one
element that commutes with z to show the protocol is based on the MSCSP
(and so the AAGL protocol would be no more secure than using another MSCSP
based protocol such as the AAG protocol given in [2]) a natural question now
arises which is.
Given the example of the MSCSPv used in the AAGL protocol how easy
or how hard is it to find an element s that commutes with z but s does not
commute with all choices of ui?
this question needs further investigation.
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Appendix
In this appendix we another version algorithm 4 which is presented in the
style of the paper [16]. Then we give an attack on the DSC (Dehornoy Shifted
Conjugacy) protocol in [14]. This appendix follows the style of the LU paper
[16].
A Probabilistic Algorithm for the Multiple Simultaneous
Conjugacy Search Problem Variant
We can define the length of the element x ∈ Bn to be the length of its
Garside normal form, and we denote an arbitrary length function by l(x) or
li(x).
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Recall, we refer the CSP as the MSCSP with u = 1 so an example of the
CSP is denoted as (x1, y1). Informally we refer to x1 as the “middle element”
of y1.
Recall, to break the scheme it is sufficient to find z or a solution that can be
used in place of z, then once the common secret conjugate z is recovered with
our attack ,the shared secret key can be computed with the linear algebraic
attack given in [1]. Recall the security of the protocol is based on the MSCSPv.
The security of the TTP algorithm is based on the MSCSPv with the elements
(x1, x2, ..., xu) = (w1, ..., wγ , v1, ..., vγ), (y1, y2, ..., yu) = (w
′
1, ..., w
′
γ , v
′
1, ..., v
′
γ)
and u = 2γ. We assume the attacker knows this instance of the MSCSPv
in the Artin representation.
In this appendix we give algorithms which are a probabilistic reduction from
the MSCSPv to the MSCSP this includes another version of algorithm 4.
At the end of the appendix we make suggestion for secure protocols param-
eters.
To summarize our work.
A. We give an algorithm (another version of algorithm 4) to show the MSC-
SPv can be probabilistically reduced to the MSCSP.
B. We give a new algorithm to solve a hard problem (which is a generalisation
of the SCSP) we refer to as the MSSDP.
C. We give an algorithm for the MSSDPv; the MSSDPv generalises the
MSCSPv and the MSSDP simultaneously.
Definition- C is an algorithm that computes elements in the centralisers of
given elements in factorial space and time complexity in a worst case.
Proposition A
For the MSCSPv with u = 1 if x1 can be feasibly computed then z can be found
by solving the CSP(x1, y1).
Proof
Follows from the definitions of MSCSPv and CSP above.
Proposition B
Let u
′
i ∼ ui, for some 1 ≤ i ≤ 2γ (i.e. the example of the MSCSPv used in the
AAGL protocol) and z, k ∈ Bn. Then for all i we have
zkz−1 ∈ CBn(u
′
i) = CBn(zuiz
−1)
where CBn(u
′
i) denotes the centraliser of u
′
i in Bn.
Proof
Obvious.
1 On n-Centraliser Attacks
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Now it follows from the above propositions A, B that the MSCSPv ((x1, x2, ..., xu), (y1, y2, ..., yu))
can be solved in two steps:
(S1) Find suitable element(s) c, c ∈ CBn(u
′
i) for at least two values of u
′
i such
that u′i = vj and u
′
i = w
′
k, and c are of the form zkz
−1 using algorithm C. The
computation of the centraliser may be based on the super summit technique in
[7]. We refer to this step as: a n−centraliser attack or a centraliser(s) attack.
(S2) Find using some algorithm: values of k, k = xi (for all i) in the MSCSPv
then solve the corresponding MSCSP.
The description of super summit sets is described in [7] so we omit the
description of that part of (S1) here. But (S1) still requires some elaboration
as follows. To be able to work with elements of CBn(u
′
i) efficiently we need to
describe CBn(u
′
i) in some convenient way, for instance by a set of generators.
Hence (S1) itself consists of two smaller steps: capturing (i.e. computing suitable
approximations of the centraliser(s)) the union of various centraliser(s) we refer
to as C′, and finding the required element c ∈ C′ in the above union. We
formalize the type of attack in (S1) as follows.
Definition-An n−centraliser attack or a centraliser(s) attack is an attack
where the computation of n centralisers is involved, then a set of elements
from the above n centraliser(s) is found in connection to some conditions. The
elements found above are used as part of the attack. E.g. we refer to step (S1)
as a (2 + d)-centralisers attack where elements are found to build an MSCSP,
otherwise if n = 1 we refer to step (S1) as a centraliser attack or a 1-centraliser
attack.
Our algorithm for the MSCSPv is a (2+d)-centraliser attack where 1 ≤ d ≤
γ − 1. A centraliser attack is given in [16] so our idea of centraliser(s) attack
extends the idea of “a centraliser attack” in [16].
The only known algorithm [9] for computing a generating set for a centralizer
reduces to the construction of super summit sets, the size of which is not known
to be polynomially bounded, and which is usually hard in practice. Hence the
approach of describing the whole generating set is not feasible but we will use a
variation of this approach. Another approach to investigate is to find a feasibly
computable subgroup as a generating set of when k is of polynomial length (and
hence feasibly computable). By polynomial above we mean the degree of the
polynomial is small enough for practical computations. We summarize the ideas
of this appendix into a heuristic probabilistic algorithm 1.1 below.
Informally, the algorithm below works because of the following:
i) If ga is small enough then the “middle elements, ‘the xi’s’ ” in the MSCSPv
can be found by guessing; the “middle element” is known in the MSCSP; hence
we can reduce MSCSPv to the MSCSP if the above guess is correct.
ii) ga is suggested to be small in the AAGL protocol because a is unknown
and AAGL is for a lightweight platform.
iii) The structure of the TTP algorithm in the AAGL protocol implies that
we can get ga = 1 for a suitable choice of the algorithm C, and if we select
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two values of u′i such that u
′
i = vj and w
′
k this implies we can inefficiently
deterministically reduce the MSCSPv to the MSCSP. This is because BL, BR
do not have any generators in common and so the middle element must be
correct for one of the two above choices of u′i.
iv) We can use some type of search, such as a heuristic search, to find the
“middle element” more efficiently.
v) We can test that we have found the correct “middle element” by using the
property of the efficiently computable braid invariant λ, which is an invariant
in conjugation, i.e. λ(x1) = λ(y1) in the CSP, we can get enough information
of the “middle element” easily without solving the triple decompostion problem
to get the “middle element”.
The text in italics at each step in the probabilistic algorithm is a suggestion
for an example of that step. The algorithm is for a general example of the
MSCSPv but suggestion are made specifically for the AAGL protocol in our
algorithm. Step A implements (S1). Step B implements (S2).
Algorithm 1.1 - Probabilistic algorithm for MSCSPv
INPUT: An example of the MSCSPv (y1, y2, ..., yu) in ((x1, x2, ..., xu), (y1, y2, ..., yu))
and the value of u called t.
OUTPUT: A solution g′ for the MSCSPv.
COMPUTATION:
A. Set S = M = C′ = A = ∅. Using an chosen algorithm C compute
C′ ⊂ CBn(u
′
i) for some values of i, i.e. C
′ = ∪∀iCBn(u
′
i). It follows the C
′ may
contain elements of the form F = zkz−1. Hence for choices of k includes all
elements in BR or BL depending if u′i = v
′
i or u
′
i = w
′
i.
There are two choices we suggest for this step:
First choice: compute the centraliser as a generating set using the algorithm
in [9]. Then select random products of the generators to give a word r. An
option for this choice is using a suitable length function l1 we would expect if r
is conjugated by z
l1(ru
′
i) < l1(r) + l1(u
′
i) and l1(u
′
ir) < l1(r) + l1(u
′
i)
The above idea is based on the Hamming distance between words: i.e. if r and
ui are both conjugated by the same element then we would expect both the
above inequalities to be true.
Second choice: Use the subalgorithm for this step described below.
B Repeat steps Bi, Bii, Biii until a solution is found.
We construct the pair (a, zaz−1) = (a, b), find a as follows, and zaz−1 ∈ C′
as follows.
Bi. Select b ∈ C′\M and add b to M if b is selected. If all possible values
for b have been used (i.e. M = C′) goto step A. Using a chosen algorithm we
find b in the pair (a, b) as follows. A choice at this step is that because anyone
knows the length gz in Artin generators of z [1] and we assume the length in
Artin generators of a is less a feasible bound ga, hence we do a type of search
24
(e.g. linear search or random search) using an algorithm that uses l2(b), gz, ga
e.g. an algorithm that uses the heuristic
l2(b) ≤ 2gz+ga.
Bii. Construct using a chosen algorithm, the set A which is the set of possible
values for a. Then using a chosen algorithm we find a ∈ A. If the relation b ∼ a
is true then add the pair (a, b) to S, because this means a is conjugate to b. M
represents worked out elements for b. S represents worked out elements that
are used in an MSCSP. A choice at this step is that we can try out all possible
values of a up to length ga (using a chosen length function) this includes easy
to guess choices which exist (follows from the TTP algorithm) for a which are
single Artin generators. We then use the practical algorithm for the CDP in [6]
to test the relation b ∼ a
λ(b) ∼ λ(a)
where λ is a braid invariant.
iii. Repeat steps i and ii until the desired value of u = t is reached in the
MSCSP. (If the desired value of t not reached then at i goes step A). Otherwise
goto step C.
C. Solve the MSCSP for all the pairs (a, b) using an algorithm that works
with high probability: if solution has been found terminate algorithm, if the
solution of the MSCSP has not been found goto step A.
Algorithm 1.2-Second choice for Subalgorithm in Step A of algorithm 1.1
Here we can use a optimization method (e.g. simulated annealing) by con-
sidering the (y1, y2, ..., yu) as input to the optimization method and minimising
the length (using a chosen length function) of a in the CSP pair (a, b). For ex-
ample the simplest choice here is the following simple optimization algorithm.
The idea of this subalgorithm is words formed from words in the generators
(y1, y2, ..., yu) are in C
′, and such word(s) may have a small length in a. The
subalgorithm can be used at least twice depending on if u′i = v
′
i or u
′
i = w
′
i.
1. Initialisation step. Choose a suitable length function l. Set fitness =
minAll k, 1≤k≤u l(yk). Set Solution = l(yk) with yk such that it has minimal
fitness (i.e. it is a solution).
2. Select random subsets of the MSCSPv (y1, y2, ..., yu) tuple, the simplest
choice at this step is to select random yi, yj for two random i and j.
3. The objective function should grow smaller as a is smaller. Then the
simplest choice is using
Objective function = l(y±1i y
±1
j ).
Then if l(y±1i y
±1
j ) < fitness we add the element y
±1
i y
±1
j to C
′ if y±1i y
±1
j /∈ C
′.
Where l is a length function.
4. Repeat steps 2 and 3 until the desired until the desired size of |C′| is
reached. If the desired size is not reached then proceed to the next step in the
main algorithm.
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Proposition 1.1
Let λ1, λ2, ω, c1, c2 ∈ ℜ. Solving the MSCSPv can be done with the probabilistic
algorithm 1.1, in approximately, time complexity O(|XSS(u′i)|
λ2ωn) and space
complexity O(c1ω
n + c2|XSS(u
′
i)|
λ1).
Proposition 1.2
Let λ1, λ2, ω, c1, c2 ∈ ℜ. This proposition improves the complexity bound of
proposition 1.1: with additional reasonable assumptions it can be improved
to time complexity O(|XSS(u′i)|
λ1n1+ǫ) and space complexity O(|XSS(u′i)|
λ2)
using algorithms to solve the MSCSP, CDP efficiently, where the element u′i is
part of the TTP’s public key, XSS is a summit type set and the constant ω
depends on n.
Proof for Proposition 1.1
We assume that algorithm 1.1 is successful this means it gives the correct
output and in particular at step Biii the value of t = u is reached and that
a linear search is used at Bi. We do the complexity analyses by following the
algorithm 1 through a successful execution.
Step A. The complexity at step A is determined by the algorithm C′ which
computes elements in the centraliser. It is assumed that C′ has factorial space
and time complexity: this assumption is based on the fact that such algorithms
exists e.g. when XSS = SSS, or XSS = SS see [9], [8] ; precisely we mean C′
has space and time complexity proportional to |XSS(u′i)|. Recall, generically
an element of C′ contains elements of the form F = zaz−1; this is an important
thing to observe.
Step Bi. Since we are trying to construct an MSCSP in t equations it follows
we have to do step Bi at least t times (i.e. at step Biii we repeat t times). In
the worst case we would have to try out all (i.e. using the linear search) of the
elements of C′ (stored in the above step) which is of size O(|XSS(u′i)|
λ1).
Step Bii. Recall we are trying to find a in F . We analyse the simplest
method which is simply to randomly guess a in its Artin generators. This gives
the following straightforward computations.
• From the TTP algorithm it follows a randomly chosen generator has prob-
ability pα =
lα
n−2 and pβ =
rβ
n−2 of being in BL and BR respectively. Hence
an attacker can selects a random word a from A using in length of ga Artin
generators then it has pα,β,ga =
1
p
ga
α
+ 1
p
ga
β
probability of being in BL or BR;
the above is true because we selected above values of u′i such that u
′
i = vj and
w′k. From step Bi we compute a subset of C
′ (with words less than a certain
bound) we do not have to pick ga too large because as noted above there exist
some a of short length in Artin generators.
• Observe the attacker must on average compute
⌈
Wp−1α,β,ga
⌉
<
(n− 2)ga
min(lα, rβ)ga
(a)
before expecting W words to be found in for a in (a, zaz−1) ∈ (A,CBn(u
′
i)).
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Choosing ga ≤ n keeps the algorithm in factorial complexity but this is not
a good choice, from the above discussion the attacker can take ga = O(
n
log(n) );
in particular from
⌈
Wp−1
α,β,O( n
log(n)
)
⌉
< O(nO(
n
log(n)
))) = O(en) = ωn (for some
ω ∈ ℜ), means this part is exponential.
• It follows the attacker needs to estimate pα, pβ . The attacker may estimate
pα, pβ if the attacker assumes lα, rβ , n are not independent of each other,
for example lα ≈ rβ and assumes for example, all nearly all possible Artin
generators are used in BL,BR : so pα ≈ pβ. Note if all possible Artin generators
are used then pα,β,1 = 1, for the selection of a (the single Artin generator).
Hence (independent of large enough n and when lα ≈ rβ), the attacker needs to
compute approximately as few as 2ga distinct words for the parameters suggested
in [1] to ensure on average a reduction to the MSCSP with at least 2 equations.
So we would need to select only approximately 4 distinct random words of
length 3 from the set of possibilities of k, before the attacker expects to get
one conjugacy equation or the CSP, the example above use little memory and
potentially little computing power.
At the next part in step Bii we use an efficient algorithm for the CDP such
as the one given in [6], use a linear search, and use an algorithm for the MSCSP
that works with high probability. It is expected from Bi the length of b is less
than ui, this means in general O(|SSS(ui)|) is greater than O(|SSS(b)|).
Step Biii. Steps Bi to Bii are repeated t times hence the complexity in the
steps is has a factor of t.
We can now evaluate the total complexity of the algorithm.
Notation-The notation As and At means the space complexity and time
complexity respectively for an arbitrary algorithm labelled A.
The time complexity is in the worst case is
O(CBn(u
′
i)t + CDPt · |CBn(u
′
i)| · ω
n +MSCSPt)
hence an upper bound is O(|XSS(u′k)|
λ1ωn).
The explanation is as follows. The term CBn(u
′
i)t used in step A is between 2 and
2 + d times or a constant number of times, and this implies the corresponding
constant in the complexity term can be ignored. The term MSCSPt is the
complexity at the last step and has order less than |XSS(u′k)|
λ1 . The term
CDPt · |CBn(u
′
i)| · ω
n is the complexity at step Bii: at step Biii means step
Bii is repeated ωn times for each possible value of a in conjunction with each
possible value for b; there are CBn(u
′
i)s values for b. Here the constant CDPt
is the average time taken to solve the CDP over all pairs (a, b). In the worst
case space complexity at this sub step is O(t|XSS(u′i)|
λ1). Clearly the term
CDPt · |CBn(u
′
i)| ·ω
n dominates the complexity. Because the CDP is done using
an efficient probabilistic algorithm such as [6] and t ≤ ωn the time complexity
follows.
27
The worst space complexity is
O(|CBn (u
′
i)|+ |A|+max
a∈A
max
b∈C′
CDPs(a, b) +MSCSPs)
hence an upper bound is O(c1|XSS(u
′
k)|
λ2 + c2ω
n).
The explanation is as follows. The terms |CBn(u
′
i)|,MSCSPs both have com-
plexity equal or less than to O(c1|XSS(u
′
k)|
λ2) (so we have combined both
complexities into one term). |A| is of size c2ω
n. maxa∈Amaxb∈C′ CDPs(a, b) is
negligible as the practical algorithm [6] stores only two elements. .
Now we are in a position to prove proposition 1.2.
Proof for Proposition 1.2
The above analysis may not be optimal, for example if we make some rea-
sonable assumptions then we get a better bound on the complexities as follows.
For this case it the average complexities (instead of worst case) for algorithm
for the CDP,CSP and MSCSP are considered.
The reasonable assumptions we are as follows.
• From [1] we assume lα, rβ are linear in n and the attacker selects ga =
O(log(n)).
• We assume we have an efficient algorithm for the CDP which has average
linear complexity possibly the one given in [5], this assumption is based on
the result that empirically for randomly chosen long random braids which have
simple elements randomly chosen, the |USS| is on average likely to be linear
in the supremum and independent of the braid index n e.g. see [5]. Hence the
CDP/CSP in this average case can be solved in linear space and time complexity;
• use an algorithm for the MSCSP that works with high probability such as
the one in [5].
It follows (using the assumptions) the dominant term in the time complexity for this term
is the dominant term for the time complexity in the related proposition 1.1 with
the term ßO(logn) replacing ωn. The time complexity in this better case can be
with high probability be (recall computing C′ that in proportional in space an
time complexity to |XSS|)
O(c1|XSS(u
′
i)|
λ1ßO(log n)O(n)) = O(|XSS(u′i)|
λ1n1+ǫ)
for some ß∈ ℜ which depends on equation a. The factor O(n) is for the com-
plexity for the CDP algorithm.
It follows (using the assumptions) the dominant term in the space complexity for this term
is related to the space complexity in the related case above proposition 1.2. The
space complexity is
O(c1|XSS(u
′
i)|
λ2 + ßO(log n) + |CBn(u
′
i)|)
≈ O(c1|XSS(u
′
i)|
λ2 + c2n
ǫ) ≈ O(|XSS(u′i)|
λ2).
Using straightforward algebra it can be shown ǫ can be close to a constant as n
becomes larger and depends on ß and the constants in O(log n), if ß is bounded
then ǫ is bounded.
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Note the space can be up to exponential size (so giving a better space bound
here), the only requirement for the algorithm to successfully terminate, is the
set C′ must be non-empty than one as it must contain at least one element with
some feasible computable k.
The above shows using the AAGL protocol can potentially be as secure as
using CSP based protocols such as the AAG protocol [2] as both can be broken
with attacks of the same or similar complexity depending on the values λ1, λ2
and ǫ, by similar we mean our instantiations of our attack can differ by a factor
that is polynomial of the bitlength attack input (i.e. similar) from attacks such
as on the AAG protocol, for example the time complexities of attack differ by
a factor of n1+ǫ compared to the SSS attack.
We can try a variant of the above algorithm, which is not use an algorithm
for the CDP in step Bii but instead solves the CSP with the guess for b with
every possible element in C′ and recovers z, and hence the shared secret using
the linear algebraic attack given in [1], the attacker may test if z is the correct
solution: for example by computing if z−1u′iz ∼ u
′
i.
Another variant we can try is: because it may be that b ∈ C′ (which may
be verified using a polynomial time word algorithm in Bn), in this case z must
be in the centraliser of b, call the set of all such stored b as bz, and so z can be
found by testing every element of the centraliser of a subset of bz for the correct
element.
Observe if the attacker assumes his guess of the generators of BL, BR are
correct (or manages know these subgroups in a different way) the attacker can
compute randomly chosen words computable in polynomial time in BL,BR,
and in up to factorial time (in approximately the time taken to solve the CDP)
find a system of conjugacy equation / reduce the security of the AAGL protocol
to the MSCSP, so this is another reason why the users should keep the subgroups
BL,BR secret. For the modification to the AAGL which is using general BR
and BL the algorithm, then our attack has to be modified to use the publicly
known information about the structures of BL and BR.
We see to increase the probability of for our attack on the AAGL protocol
above to succeed we have to compute a “something like a geodesic of u′i”. A
geodesic of a braid is a braid word of minimum length in the Artin generators
representing a given braid. It is known that computing the geodesic of a braid
is an NP-complete problem. However the version of the geodesic problem the
AAGL protocol is based upon is to find a word equivalent to zaz−1 such that
it is short enough for a to be feasible computed. WLOG assume za ∈ B+n , the
above problem is (easily) equivalent to replacing zaz−1 by zaz∗ where z∗ =
z−1∆sup(z), so it is sufficient to find a geodesic like element of zaz∗ in B+n . Even
though computing a geodesic is NP-complete there are two reasons why the
above problem may still be easy: the first is the problem is a version of the
geodesic problem and not the exact geodesic problem; the second is there are
many NP-complete problems have polynomial time average case solutions, e.g.
observe it is easy compute a geodesic of a permutations braid hints that there
is such a solution of the above problem.
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2 A Centralisers Attack on the Multiple Simultaneous Shifted Decomposition Problem -MSSDP
Recall the shift operator in B∞ for the word w = σ
ǫ1
i1
...σǫkik as the word
d(w) = σǫ1i1+1 ...σ
ǫk
ik+1
This operator induces a monomorphism on the infinite braid group. Recall the
braid a ∗ b is
a ∗ b = a · d(b) · σ1 · d(a
−1),
and the operator ∗ is the shifted conjugacy operator. Recall the SCSP (shifted
conjugacy search problem) is defined as the following hard problem. For braids
x, y, c ∈ B∞ find a braid x ∈ B∞ such that y = x ∗ c : where c, y are publicly
known and x is secret.
We now generalise the SCSP in a straight forward way to a hard decompo-
sition type problem called the SDP.
Definition. The SDP (shifted decomposition problem), for braids w, x, y, c ∈
B∞ find braids w, x ∈ B∞ such that y = w ·d(c) ·σ1 ·d(x) where c, y are publicly
known and w, x are secret. The SDP is a generalisation because with x = w−1
we recover the SCSP.
Notation. We use the notation w ∗ c ∗ x = y for the SDP.
Definition. The MSSDP (multiple simultaneous SDP), is a set of SDP
equations, as follows. Let n ≥ 1 be a fixed integer. For braids w, x, yi, ci ∈ B∞,
1 ≤ i ≤ n find braids w, x ∈ B∞ such that yi = wd(ci)σ1d(x) where ci, y are
publicly known and w, x are secret.
There are no efficient solutions for solving the MSSDP, one reason for is this
would mean the SCSP would be easy. We propose a solution for MSSDP.
Consider n = 4 in the MSSDP and c1 6= c2, c3 6= c4, this is the system of
equations
y1 = wd(c1)σ1d(x), y2 = wd(c2)σ1d(x) (b)
y3 = wd(c3)σ1d(x) and y4 = wd(c4)σ1d(x).
We now use the idea CE (conjugacy extractor) [13] used to transform the
MSSDP into a shifted MSCSP type problem very efficiently: the transformation
is achieved using CE functions, the concept of CE functions were first introduced
in our paper [13]. A CE function is defined as follows, definition A CE func-
tion uses input from public information in a hard problem and transforms the
hard problem into a an example of the CSP. First we give the mathematical
background then we give our centralisers attack.
On an algorithm For the MSSDP
Define the CE function for one SDP in b as
CE(y1, y2) = y
−1
1 y2 = d
−1(x)σ−11 d
−1(c1)d(c2)σ1d(x) (c)
which is equivalent to solving the CSP with (σ−11 d
−1(c1)w
−1wd(c2)σ1, CE(y1, y2))
with solution d(x).
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For n ∈ N define the braids
δn = σn−1...σ1.
Then for i = 1, ..., n− 1
δ−1n+1σiδn+1 =Bn+1 σi+1 = d(σi). (d)
Proposition 2.1
Let x,CE(y1, y2), σ
−1
1 d
−1(c1)d(c2)σ1 ∈ Bn. Then d(x) satisfies equation c
for the CSP (σ−11 d
−1(c1)d(c2)σ1, CE(y1, y2)) if and only if it satisfies the CSP
(δn+1σ
−1
1 d
−1(c1)d(c2)σ1δ
−1
n+1, δn+1CE(y1, y2)δ
−1
n+1) i.e.
δn+1CE(y1, y2)δ
−1
n+1 = xδn+1σ
−1
1 d
−1(c1)d(c2)σ1δ
−1
n+1x
−1. (e)
Proof
Follows from d.
Proposition 2.2
let x,CE(y1, y2), σ
−1
1 d
−1(c1)d(c2)σ1 ∈ Bn be braids satisfying equation c
and let x′1 ∈ Bn+1. Then
δn+1CE(y1, y2)δ
−1
n+1 = x
′
1δn+1σ
−1
1 d
−1(c1)d(c2)σ1δ
−1
n+1x
′−1
1 ⇔
x′−11 x ∈ CBn+1(δn+1σ
−1
1 d
−1(c1)d(c2)σ1δ
−1
n+1)
where CBn+1 is a centraliser in Bn+1.
Proof
The proof for the similar proposition in [16] is “obvious” and so is the proof
for this proposition.
Now consider the equation
CE(y3, y4) = y
−1
3 y4 = d
−1(x)σ−11 d
−1(c3)d(c4)σ1d(x) (f)
We can now easily derive two very similar propositions to 2.1, 2.2 where we
use y3, y4 in place of y1, y2 respectively. To be precise and to be complete the
propositions are 2.3 and 2.4.
Proposition 2.3
Let x,CE(y3, y4), σ
−1
1 d
−1(c3)d(c4)σ1 ∈ Bn. Then d(x) satisfies the equation
f for the CSP (σ−11 d
−1(c3)d(c3)σ1, CE(y3, y4)) if and only if it satisfies the CSP
(δn+1σ
−1
1 d
−1(c3)d(c4)σ1δ
−1
n+1, δn+1CE(y3, y4)δ
−1
n+1) i.e.
δn+1CE(y3, y4)δ
−1
n+1 = x
−1δn+1σ
−1
1 d
−1(c3)d(c4)σ1δ
−1
n+1x. (g)
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Proposition 2.4
Let x,CE(y3, y4), σ
−1
1 d
−1(c3)d(c4)σ1 ∈ Bn. be braids satisfying f and let
x′2 ∈ Bn+1. Then
δn+1CE(y3, y4)δ
−1
n+1 = x
′
2δn+1σ
−1
1 d
−1(c3)d(c4)σ1δ
−1
n+1x
′−1
2 ⇔
x′−12 x ∈ CBn+1(δn+1σ
−1
1 d
−1(c3)d(c4)σ1δ
−1
n+1)
We now describe a 2-centralisers attack on the MSSDP that recovers x. Once
x is recovered we attempt to find w by computing yi(d(ci)σ1d(x))
−1 =? w.
Now it follows from the above four propositions the MSSDP can be solved
using the following steps.
(S1). Find the solution x′1, x
′
2 ∈ Bn+1
δn+1CE(y1, y2)δ
−1
n+1 = x
′
1δn+1σ
−1
1 d
−1(c1)d(c2)σ1δ
−1
n+1x
′−1
1 (h)
δn+1CE(y3, y4)δ
−1
n+1 = x
′
2δn+1σ
−1
1 d
−1(c3)d(c4)σ1δ
−1
n+1x
′−1
2 (i)
this can be done using and XSS based algorithm e.g. using the USS technique
of [5].
(S2). ”Correct” the elements x′1, x
′
2 ∈ Bn+1 to obtain a solution to get
s ∈ Bn for the MSCSP in c and f i.e. find elements C1, C2 such that
C1, C2 ∈ CBn+1(δn+1σ
−1
1 d
−1(c1)d(c2)σ1δ
−1
n+1)∪CBn+1(δn+1σ
−1
1 d
−1(c3)d(c4)σ1δ
−1
n+1)
to obtain a solution
t = x′1C1 = x
′
2C2 ∈ Bn. (j)
In j we are using the fact that we are solving an MSCSP c, f and attempting
to recover the same value x (i.e. x = t here) in that MSCSP. This step is a
2-centralisers attack.
We now derive a feasibly computable subgroup ofCBn+1(δn+1σ
−1
1 d
−1(c1)d(c2)σ1δ
−1
n+1)
the derivation for CBn+1(δn+1σ
−1
1 d
−1(c3)d(c4)σ1δ
−1
n+1) is similar.
For c1, c2 ∈ Bn define the braids
d1 = ∆
2
n+1, d2 = σn...σ2d
−1(c1)d(c2)σ
−1
2 ...σ
−1
n , d3 = σ1...σ
2
nσn−1...σ1
and
d4 = d
−1
1 , d5 = d
−1
2 , d6 = d
−1
3 .
Proposition 2.5
There is a similar proposition in [16]. Let c1, c2 ∈ Bn and C = CBn+1(δn+1σ
−1
1 d
−1(c3)d(c4)σ1δ
−1
n+1).
The following i) and ii) holds.
i) d1, d2, d3 ∈ C.
ii) C′ = 〈d1, d2, d3〉 is an abelian subgroup of Bn+1 and hence of polynomial
growth.
Proof
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Observe in Bn+1
σn...σ2d
−1(c1)d(c2)σ
−1
2 ...σ
−1
n = δn+1σ
−1
1 d
−1(c1)d(c2)σ1δ
−1
n+1
so d2 ∈ C. We know from [16] for arbitrary pi ∈ Bn that elements of the
form d(pi)σ
−1
2 ...σ
−1
n commute with d3, hence d3 commutes with d2, as d2 is of
the form d2 = (d(p1)σ
−1
2 ...σ
−1
n )
−1d(p2)σ
−1
2 ...σ
−1
n . d1 is in the center hence the
subgroup C′ is abelian.
Straight forward variations of our attack are possible. One is could be as
follows. Let x′1 = x
′
2 i.e. solve an MSCSP at (S1) and the correct this solution
using C1,C2 and we may recover the actual value of r from one of the correct
solutions.
Our ideas can be summarised into the following algorithm.
Algorithm 2.1 - Heuristic Algorithm for solving the MSSDP.
INPUT: The example of the MSSDP given by the equations c
y1 = wd(c1)σ1d(x), y2 = wd(c2)σ1d(x)
y3 = wd(c3)σ1d(x) and y4 = wd(c4)σ1d(x);
an objective function f such that f = 0 when a solution to the MSSDP is found.
OUTPUT: A solution of the MSSDP.
COMPUTATION:
A. Compute
CE(y1, y2) = y
−1
1 y2 = d
−1(x)σ−11 d
−1(c1)d(c2)σ1d(x) (k)
which is the CSP with (σ−11 d
−1(c1)w
−1wd(c2)σ1, CE(y1, y2)) with solution d(x)
CE(y3, y4) = y
−1
3 y4 = d
−1(x)σ−11 d
−1(c3)d(c4)σ1d(x) (l)
Note we have transformed the MSSDP into an MSCSP involving the shift op-
erator because equations k and l are an MSCSP in d(x).
B. Using an XSS algorithm e.g. the USS technique compute the solutions
s′1, s
′
2 ∈ Bn+1
δn+1CE(y1, y2)δ
−1
n+1 = s
′
1δn+1σ
−1
1 d
−1(c1)d(c2)σ1δ
−1
n+1s
′−1
1
δn+1CE(y3, y4)δ
−1
n+1 = s
′
2δn+1σ
−1
1 d
−1(c3)d(c4)σ1δ
−1
n+1s
′−1
2 .
C. Put S = (s′1, s
′
2, f(|y
−1
1 · ((y1 · d(s
′−1
1 ) · σ
−1
1 · d(c
−1
1 )) ∗ c1 ∗ s
′
1)|∆n+1 , |y
−1
2 ·
((y2 · d(s
′−1
2 ) · σ
−1
1 · d(c
−1
2 )) ∗ c2 ∗ s
′
2)|∆n+1)) = (s
′
1, s
′
2, f) and M = ⊘.
D. Until a solution is found.
1. Choose a tuple (t, u, lt) from S with the smallest lt.
2. If f = 0 then output t (here t = u) and
w = y−11 · ((y1 · d(s
′−1
1 ) · σ
−1
1 · d(c
−1
1 )). (m)
Note if f = 0 then by equations j and m we get the actual value of w.
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3. Otherwise for each i = 1, ...,K and j = 1, ..., L, for some natural numbers
K and L.
(i) Compute ti = t · Ci, uj = u · Cj and f
(ii). If (ti, uj, f) belongs neither to S nor to M then to add it into S.
4. Remove the current pair (t, u, f) from S and add it to M .
3 An Algorithm for the Multiple Simultaneous Shifted Decomposition Problem Variant MSSDPv
Definition. The MSSDPv (multiple simultaneous SDP variant) is as fol-
lows. Let n ≥ 1 be a fixed integer. For braids w, x, yi, ci ∈ B∞ 1 ≤ i ≤ n find
braids w, x ∈ B∞ such that yi = wd(ci)σ1d(x) where yi are publicly known and
w, x, ci are secret.
Clearly the MSSDPv generalises the MSCSPv. The generalisation of the
MSSDPv for the MSSDP is similar to the generalisation of the MSCSPv for the
MSCSP.
There are no efficient solutions for solving the MSSDPv one reason for this is
it would mean the SCSP would be easy. In this appendix we propose a solution
for the MSSDPv.
Consider when n = 4 in the MSSDPv and c1 6= c2, c3 6= c4 and consider
when n = 4 in the MSSDP and c1 6= c2, c3 6= c4, this is the system of equations
y1 = wd(c1)σ1d(x), y2 = wd(c2)σ1d(x) (n)
y3 = wd(c3)σ1d(x) and y4 = wd(c4)σ1d(x)
Again using CE functions we transform the MSSDPv into a shifted MSCSPv
type problem very efficiently.
As the MSSDPv generalises the MSCSPv we can use our algorithm for the
MSSDPv to attack the AAGL protocol in [1].
Algorithm 3.1- Heuristic Algorithm for Solving the MSSDPv
INPUT: The example of the MSSDPv which are equations n above.
OUTPUT: A solution of the MSSDPv.
COMPUTATION:
A. First we compute
CE(y1, y2) = y
−1
1 y2 = d
−1(x)σ−11 d
−1(c1)d(c2)σ1d(x) (o)
which is the CSP with (σ−11 d
−1(c1)w
−1wd(c2)σ1, CE(y1, y2)) with solution
d(x)
CE(y3, y4) = y
−1
3 y4 = d
−1(x)σ−11 d
−1(c3)d(c4)σ1d(x). (p)
Note we have transformed the MSSDPv into the MSCSPv involving the shift
operator. We observe equations o and p are an MSCSPv in d(x), σ−11 d
−1(c1)d(c2)σ1,
σ−11 d
−1(c3)d(c4)σ1 and so we then use algorithm 1.1 to recover the “middle el-
ements” σ−11 d
−1(c1)d(c2)σ1 and σ
−1
1 d
−1(c3)d(c4)σ1: if the “middle elements”
have not been recovered then the algorithm has failed and stops here. Otherwise
if the algorithm 1.1 fails to find d(x) and hence x we goto step B to attempt to
find x in a different way.
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B.Use the algorithm 2.1 to solve the MSSDP to attempt to find x.
C. If x has not been found the algorithm has failed otherwise the algorithm
is successful.
4 Attack on Dehornoy’s Shifted Conjugacy Protocol
We can apply our algorithm for the MSSDP to attack the shifted CSP based
protocol [14] in the following specific scenario. We refer the reader to [14] for
details of the DSC protocol.
Alice’s authenticates to Bob using r as described in [14]. Then Bob reuses
Alice’s r as his random value in the commitment with another user (may be not
Alice) because he assumes it is safe to do so. Following the notation in [14] of the
DSC protocol we can attack that protocol: by letting in the MSSDP x = w−1
, w = r, c1 = xA, c2 = x
′
A, c3 = xB, c4 = x
′
B; recall from [14] that Alice’s
commitment (xA, x
′
A) = (r ∗ p, r ∗ p
′) and (p, p′) are publicly known; similarly
the notation (xB , x
′
B) refers to Bob commitment. Then when we have found
a value for r using our algorithm for the MSSDP we would expect (because of
equation j) this value to be the actual value of r used in the protocol instead of
a different value satisfying the two equation MSCSP in r. Then when we have
this correct value of r we can recover Alice’s or Bob’s secret key as follows. r ∗ s
is publicly known, the attacker waits for b = 1 then computes
r−1 · (r ∗ s) · dr · σ−11 = ds,
noting we can invert the shift operator on ds we recover s hence breaking the
scheme.
5 Comparison of Our Attack with the Longrigg-Ushakov Attack
We summarize the differences between our new attack and the LU attack in
[16].
i) The LU attack is based on solving the CSP. Our attack is based on the
MSCSP.
ii) The LU attack finds Alice’s secret key s or an equivalent key for s in a
different way compared to our attack. Our attack, when it is used to attack
the DSC protocol, finds the random braid r in the commitment (and not a
equivalent value for r) then using this value of r we recover s.
iii) The LU attack is for a general scenario. Our attack is for a more specific
scenario which implies an MSCSP in r.
iv) Our simple variation of our attack described above is based on solving
the MSCSP at (S1) and the similar step in the LU attack is based on CSP.
Because the CSP is known to be harder than the MSCSP, hence our attack will
succeed in recovering s when the LU attack fails in some scenarios.
v) The LU attack cannot be used to solve the MSSDP but the LU attack can
be used to solve the SCSP. Our attack solves the MSSDP but does not solve the
version of the SCSP used in the DSC protocol because the CE function does
not exist for s.
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vi) The LU attack only solves one equation which is the SCSP. Our attack
can be extended in a straightforward way to solve the MSSDPv, MSSDP for any
n: to derive the attack for a system of n equations is similar to the examples for
n = 4 given above. We now give suggestions for selecting secure parameters.
To defend against the attacks for the AAGL attack we suggest the following.
i) Ensure if possible that elements of the centraliser of u′i are hard with the
CSP (k,zkz−1).
ii) Ensure that elements of the centraliser of the form zkz−1 of u′i cannot be
feasibly computed.
iii) The TTP algorithm may be modified with different choices of BL,BR
so that larger generators are used with the constraint of using RFID tags.
To defend against attack for the DSC scheme we suggest the following.
i) The example of the MSSDP in the Dehornoy scheme is hard.
ii) Choose the centraliser C is large.
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